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Premature notice of trustee sale: 
Knapp v Dohertym, 2004 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Slightly premature service of notice of nonjudicial foreclosure sale did not invalidate sale 
when trustor was not prejudiced. 
Knapp v Doherty (2004) 123 CA4th 76, 20 CR3d 1 
 
In November 2002, approximately one year after the original date noticed for the foreclosure 
sale and after 14 postponements of the sale date, the Knapps lost their home through nonjudicial 
foreclosure. Before the sale, the Knapps did nothing to cure their default. After the buyer at the 
trustee sale sued to evict them, the Knapps sued to set aside the trustee sale, claiming that the 
sale notice was never served, as required by statute. The trial court granted summary judgment 
for the lender, trustee, and buyer.  
 
The court of appeal affirmed. Ordinarily, a material defect in the notice would void a 
nonjudicial foreclosure. Here, however, the court found that a copy of the notice of trustee sale 
was served on the Knapps by registered or certified mail and by first class mail. The court 
explained that there is no statutory requirement that t e Knapps receive actual notice so long as 
the notice was provided in compliance with the statute. The court also held that, although the 
trustee sale notice was served nine days prematurely, that minor procedural irregularity did not 
prejudice the Knapps, who had received adequate notice f the sale.  
 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: The trouble with safe harbors is that they present problems for the 
ship that arrives somewhat off course but nevertheless still manages to land safely. Under 
the UCC’s requirement that foreclosure sales be conducted in a commercially reasonable 
manner, what happened here should have been a simple matter, because the lender clearly 
had waited long enough and the borrowers were fullyaware that their home was going to be 
sold. But for a real estate foreclosure sale conducted under the Civil Code, compliance with 
the statutory requirements turns more on whether the “i” s were dotted and the “t” s crossed 
than on whether the actual conduct of a sale really affected the outcome. 
 
This decision is somewhat of a rarity in concluding that there was a technical breach—
but that it did not really matter. I, too, think there was a breach and that it didn’t matter, but 
I’m not certain those two conclusions would have led me to rule that the sale should 
therefore be upheld. Luckily, the judges had to decide that one, not me. 
 
There certainly was a breach. Civil Code §2924(b) says a beneficiary cannot send a 
notice of sale (NOS) less than three months after a notice of default (NOD) was given. In 
this case the NOD was recorded September 5, and the NOS was mailed November 28. Even 
if some discrepancy occurred due to use of the recording date for the NOD and the mailing 
date for the NOS, November 28 is still over a week b fore the proper date of December 5—
a gap I would call more than “slightly premature.” 
 
But, just as certainly, that inopportune notice did not matter. It did not lead to an untimely 
sale: The original date set for sale by the NOS wasDecember 27—still more than the 20 
days required by CC §2924b(c)(3) and §2924f—and the actual sale date was 11 months 
after that. And the borrowers were always fully aware of these times. 
 
So how does one decide whether the sale should be uph ld or nullified? The legislature 
has never really explicated its reasons for the two different time periods following the notice 
of default and the notice of sale, although the logic is not hard to fathom. The three-month 
wait after an NOD is intended to give borrowers time to get their finances back together, to 
cure their defaults by paying their arrearages, andthus enable them to continue on as 
owners and mortgagors. 
 
The 20-day time period after that serves an entirely different purpose. It is certainly not 
designed just to give the borrowers an extra three w ks to fix things up. (Indeed, in earlier 
versions of the statute the right of reinstatement ended once the NOS had been sent.) This 
second period is there because, after the first three months, there is no reason to hold out 
hope for the debtors to cure, and it is time to go ab ut the business of notifying the public 
that a foreclosure sale is coming up. 
 
The separation is not perfect. Although the 20 days is intended to give buyers time to get 
their bids ready, there is no harm in also allowing the debtors to use that time to save their 
property, i.e., to reinstate (pay only the arrearages) during the next 15 days, and to redeem 
(pay the entire debt) during the last 5 days. 
 
In that kind of environment, a too-hasty notice of sale is harmful only if it prematurely 
terminates a right of reinstatement, or sets a premature sale date, or causes people to get too 
confused to act properly. Since none of those evils happened here, the conclusion is justified 
that the error did not matter. (That conclusion might seem to need a trial to support it, but it 
probably has sufficient prima facie validity to support a summary judgment for the lender in 
the absence of any declaration by the debtor (or by bidders) as to how any prejudice arose 
from it.) 
 
That still leaves open the final question of what judges should do when they believe there 
was a violation, but they think it didn’t matter. Does the doctrine of harmless error apply to 
safe harbors? In the reverse case, i.e.  when there is actual harm despite full compliance 
with the formalities (e.g., when notices were properly mailed by the creditor but never 
received by the debtors), the safety of the harbor trumps the fact that the ship sank. In this 
case, the judges filled in another panel of the picture by adding that there is no liability for 
not landing at an unsafe harbor so long as the ship stayed afloat. 
 
I discussed this case with Stephen Dyer, one of my collaborators on our California Real 
Estate Finance Casebook, who raised the following additional questions: 
 
● What should a foreclosure trustee do if it discovers the sale is scheduled prematurely, 
either before it has been conducted or afterwards, but before a trustee’s deed has been 
delivered to the purchaser? 
● Will the recitals in the trustee’s deed make a difference? 
● If courts now must also decide whether a procedural defect is significant enough to 
warrant setting aside a sale, how does that standard get defined? 
● With so many trustee sales going on, would a bright-l ne standard be more sensible, even 
if it does sometimes seem to operate arbitrarily? 
I wish I had answers to any of these.    —Roger Bernhardt 
 
